

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 NASSAU 01752 172140Z

70

ACTION IO-10

INFO OCT-01 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 AF-06 NEA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 ACDA-05 OMB-01 SAJ-01

/105 W

----- 025033

P 171942Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7393

AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL NASSAU 1752

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UN KS BF

SUBJ: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA: LOBBYING FOR FRIENDLY POSITION

REF: NASSAU 1738 AND PREVIOUS

1. KOREAN AMBASSADOR TO U.S. HAHM PYONG-CHOON, SAW MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY THIS MORNING FOR 25-MINUTE SESSION WHICH ADDERLEY RELUCTANTLY GRANTED DESPITE FACT THAT HE WAS DUE IN BAHAMIAN SENATE FOR A VOTE ON NEW IMMIGRATION LAW. ACCORDING TO HAHM, ADDERLEY REPEATED THAT GCOB WILL OPPOSE PRIORITY FOR HOSTILE RESOLUTION AND WILL VOTE FOR FRIENDLY RESOLUTION. AT SAME TIME, HE STILL REMAINS UNDECIDED ON WHETHER TO ABSTAIN OR VOTE AGAINST HOSTILE RESOLUTION.

2. HAHM FOUND ADDERLEY TO BE WELL VERSED ON THE SUBJECT APPARENTLY HAVING READ AND BEEN BRIEFED ON MATERIALS LEFT AT MINEXTAFF BY FIRST SECRETARY PARK YESTERDAY. IN HAHM'S OPINION, ADDERLEY'S PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION IN MAKING DECISION ON HOSTILE RES VOTE IS TO MAKE SURE THAT GCOB DOES NOT "STICK ITS NECK OUT THUS CAUSING TI TO LOSE FACE IN EYES OF NON-
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 NASSAU 01752 172140Z

ALIGNED WORLD." ALTHOUGH ADDERLEY'S INITIAL RESPONSE APPEARED

TO FAVOR ABSTENTION ON THIS ISSUE, HAHM'S STRONG PITCH APPARENTLY PRODUCED DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY AND ADDERLEY EXPRESSED INTENTION OF SEEKING FURTHER ADVICE AND COUNSEL FROM BAHAMIAN CHARGE HEPBURN IN NEW YORK AS TO HOW VOTE ON HOSTILE RESOLUTION MIGHT GO AND WHO WILL BE VOTING FOR, AGAINST, OR ABSTAINING. HEPBURN REPEATED ADDERLEY'S CONCERN THAT GCOB NOT BE CAUGHT VOTING AGAINST THE RESOLUTION IF THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF A LANDSLIDE VOTE IN ITS FAVOR.

3. OTHER QUESTIONS RAISED BY ADDERLEY IN SHORT MEETING WITH HAHM INCLUDED FOLLOWING:

- A. WAS IT POSSIBLE THAT HOSTILE RES WOULD NEVER COME TO VOTE? IF FRIENDLY RES PASSES, WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DEVISE A PROCEDURAL RES STATING IN EFFECT THAT HOSTILE RES NEED NOT BE TABLED? (HAHM EXPLAINED LAST YEAR'S SCENARIO AND HOW SIMILAR EFFORT HAD FAILED.)
- B. WHAT WOULD BE EFFECT OF PASSAGE OF BOTH FRIENDLY AND HOSTILE RESOLUTIONS? WOULD THEY NOT EFFECTIVELY CANCEL EACH OTHER OUT THUS LEAVING SITUATION AS IS? (HAHM EXPLAINED THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A SITUATION STRESSING HOW, IN HIS OPINION, IT WOULD LEAD TO THE UNRAVELLING OF THE ENTIRE FABRIC OF PEACE IN THE PENINSULA.)
- C. HOW WOULD CERTAIN OTHER STATES VOTE ON HOSTILE RES? SPECIFICALLY, NEW AFRICAN STATES SUCH AS CAPE VERDES, GUINEA BISSAU, PRINCIPE AND SAO TOME.

4. HAHM STATED THAT IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION THAT ADDERLEY WAS MOST INFLUENCED BY THE "HUMANITARIAN APPEAL" OF HIS ARGUMENT I.E. THAT THIS ISSUE INVOLVES WAR AND PEACE IN KOREA, THAT HUMAN LIVES ARE THUS AT STAKE, THAT SHOULD WAR BREAK OUT CERTAINLY THE GCOB WITHIN THE UN WOULD SUPPORT AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE WHAT PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED BY DESTROYING AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT? HAHM ALSO CONVINCED THAT MAIN TARGET FOR EFFORT IS NOW HEPBURN WHO, IN HIS OPINION, IS RESPECTED AND TRUSTED BY ADDERLEY AND WHOSE RECOMMENDATIONS WILL BE CRUCIAL. EMBASSY AGREES THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO ATTEMPT TO GET THROUGH TO HEPBURN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN THIS REGARD, EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT OUR VIEWS MIGHT BE BETTER RECEIVED WERE THEY TO BE CONVEYED PRIMARILY THROUGH THIRD PARTIES WITH U.S. FOLLOW-UP RATHER THAN VICE-CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NASSAU 01752 172140Z

VERSA.
TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptoning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LOBBYING, TERRITORIAL REVERSION, UNGA RESOLUTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 17 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NASSAU01752
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750361-0427
From: NASSAU
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751043/aaaablx.fel
Line Count: 109
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 2
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 NASSAU 1738
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24 JUN 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <24 JUN 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <13 NOV 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KOREA AT 30TH UNGA: LOBBYING FOR FRIENDLY POSITION
TAGS: PFOR, KS, BF, KN, UN, (HAHM PYONG-CHOON), (ADDERLEY, PAUL L)
To: USUN NEW YORK
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006